INTRODUCTION
Consider a game in which a single long-run player faces an infinite sequence of opponents, each of whom play only once. While such a game will often have multiple equilibria, a common intuition is that the "most reasonable" equilibrium is the one which the long-run player most prefers. This paper shows that "reputation effects" provides a foundation for that intuition, and it also identifies an important way in which the intuition must be qualified.
More specifically, imagine that players move simultaneously in each period, and let the "Stackelberg outcome" be the long-run player's most preferred outcome of the stage game under the constraint that each short-run player chooses an action that maximizes his single-period payoff. Now formulate the situation as a game of incomplete information, and imagine that with non-zero probability the long-run player is a "type" who always plays his Stackelberg action. When the discount factor is sufficiently near to one, any Nash equilibrium must give the long-run player almost his Stackelberg payoff. The intuition is the familiar one that the long-run player can choose to play as if he were the type that always plays Stackelberg, and can thus acquire the "reputation" for being a Stackelberg type.
This intuition relies on the assumption that the short-run players in fact observe the long-run player's strategy in the stage games, and need not hold in sequential-move games where some actions by the short-run player may prevent the long-run player from acting at all.
Our work builds on that of several previous authors, most directly that of , , and Fudenberg-Kreps [1987] on reputation effects in the chain-store paradox. These papers considered a long-lived incumbent facing a succession of short-lived entrants, and showed that if there was a small chance that the incumbent was "tough," it could deter entry by maintaining a reputation for toughness. Our result improves on theirs in several ways, all of which stem from the fact that our results apply to all of the Nash equilibria of the repeated game.
First, our results are robust to further small changes in the information structure of the game.
The earlier arguments depend on the restriction to sequential i equilibria, which as Fudenberg-Kreps-Levine [1987] have argued, is not robust to such changes. Second, our proof is much simpler, and provides a clearer understanding of the reputation-effects phenomenon. The point is simply that since the short-run players are myopic, they will play as Stackelberg followers in any period they attach a large probability to the long-run player playing like a Stackelberg leader. We use this observation to show that if the long-run player chooses his Stackelberg action in every period, there is an upper bound on the number of times the short-run players can fail to play as Stackelberg followers.
This argument is much simpler than the earlier ones, which were obtained by characterizing the sequential equilibria.
(The earlier papers did however, obtain characterizations of equilibrium play as well as of the equilibrium payoffs.)
Third, because our proof is simpler, we are able to study a broader class of games.
We consider arbitrary specifications of the stage game, as opposed to the special case of the chain store, and we consider a more general form of the incomplete information: Where the earlier papers specified that the long-run player had two or three types, our result covers all games in which the "Stackelberg type" has positive probability. Also, our results extend to non-stationary games in which the long-run player has private information about his payoffs in addition to knowing whether or not he is a "Stackelberg type."
Our work is also related to that of Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts -Wilson [1982] and Fudenberg-Maskin [1986] on reputation effects in games where all of the players are long-lived, and, more closely, to that of Aumann-Sorin [1987] . Kreps-Milgrom- In the unperturbed repeated game G(S) , the long-run player discounts his expected payoffs using the discount factor 6, < 6 < 
THE PERTURBED GAME
This section introduces the perturbed game and gives the first version of our bounds on the long-run player's Nash equilibrium payoff. Section four gives examples to show that this bound cannot in general be improved on, and that there are generally many Nash equilibria.
In the perturbed game, player one knows his own payoff function, but the short-run players do not. We represent their uncertainty about player one's payoffs using Harsanyi's [1967] notion of a game of incomplete information. Player one's payoff is identified with his "type" w € Q.
It is common knowledge that the short-run players have (identical) prior beliefs y. about u>, represented by a probability measure on f). Since the perturbed game has countably many types and periods, and finitely many actions per type and period, the set of Nash equilibria is a closed non-empty set. This follows from the standard results on the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in finite games, and the limiting results of Fudenberg and Levine [1983, 1986] . Consequently, we may define V (6,fi,u> n ) to be the least payoff to a player one of type w in any Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game C(6,/j). Observe that the minimum is taken over all mixed strategy equilibria, and not merely pure strategy equilibria. TT-1 1 XT-X Combining this with (7) and (8) and Milstrom-Roberts [1982] has sequential moves and not simultaneous ones. As we show in section five, their positive results are due to the special nature of the payoffs that they considered. If p(w-u ) is near to one, then, regardless of 6, the game G(S,n) has several sequential equilibria, all of which satisfy our bound. Figure 3) The Stackelberg outcome here is for player one to "promise" to choose high quality, so that all the customers will come in. Our second response is developed in the next section, which gives a lower bound on player one's payoff that holds for general games.
Before developing that argument, let us explain why the problem raised in example 3 does not arise in the chain store paradox (Figure 4) . There, the one action the entrant could take that "hid" the incumbent's strategy Section 5a treats the case with several interacting short-run players in each period, and section 5b handles general but finite two-player stage games.
We defer the technical complications posed by uncountably many actions and types to section six.
5a.
Several Short -Run Plavers
Imagine now that the stage game is a finite n-player simultaneous move As before, let s* be a Stackelberg action for player one, that is, an action that attains g* This situation is much the same as with a single short-run player, and as one would expect, the approach of theorem 1 can be readily extended.
There is only one minor complication: in the proof of theorem 1 we argued that since the set B(s*) contained all the best responses to s*, then there was a probability -n < 1 such that if player one was expected to play s* with probability exceeding jt, player two would choose an action in B(s*).
With several short-run players, the Nash correspondence B(«) need Finally, take 6 large enough that 5 exceeds
(1-e).
I
Our results use the hypothesis that player one's opponents are shortlived only to ensure that they always play myopically. Thus, theorem 2 extends to games where a "large" player one faces a continuum of "small" opponents, with the (non-innocuous) assumption that no player can observe the actions of a set of opponents of measure zero. This makes precise a sense in which being infinitely larger than one's opponents is the same as 24 being infinitely more patient than they are.
The large-and small-players case differs from the long-and shortlived one in that our results for the latter hold for any discount factor, while for the former they hold only in the continuum of players limit. An exact analogy between the cases would require that there be a bound on player one's payoffs when he faces small but not infinitesimal opponents, but this is not possible without further assumptions. The difficulty is that when players are small but not infinitesimal, they can have a large influence on equilibrium play. This is why the assumption that measure-zero deviates are ignored is not innocuous. This is discussed in FudenbergLevine [1987a] .
5b .
General Deterministic Stage Games
Here we take up the point raised by example 3. 
